



The ATM Digital Readiness Diagnostic

*Twelve questions every ANSP should answer before committing
to modernisation*

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Foreword

Most ATM modernisation programmes do not fail at cutover. They fail at procurement, and then take two to five years to reveal it.

By the time a new system is installed and training sessions begin, the decisions that determine whether the programme will reach operational service have already been made. Whether operational staff had meaningful input into the requirements. Whether someone owns the path from installation to operational service, or whether it is assumed the vendor will handle it. Whether the organisation is capable of absorbing the change, or whether "readiness" has been confused with "enthusiasm at the steering committee." Whether anyone has planned for the eighteen months between the system being physically present and the system being trusted.

These decisions are rarely revisited once made. They surface later, disguised as other problems. Training resistance. Regulatory delays. Vendor disputes. Safety case bottlenecks. Controller complaints about missing features. Each of these looks like a local failure that can be managed locally. None of them can. They are symptoms of decisions made months or years earlier, by people who are often no longer in the room.

This diagnostic exists for the programme directors, CAA modernisation leads, and ANSP executives who are about to sign, or who have just signed, an ATM modernisation contract. The questions are not difficult. Most of them can be answered in a sentence. The difficulty is that answering them honestly requires admitting what has not yet been decided, and by whom.

There are twelve questions, grouped into four themes. The themes escalate. Questions in Theme 1 are the ones most programmes get wrong first. Questions in Theme 4 are the ones most programmes do not realise they have got wrong until operational cutover is imminent and the options have closed.

This is a framework, not a scorecard. There is no number at the end that tells you whether your programme will succeed. The point of the exercise is not to produce a result. It is to surface, in language you can take into your next steering committee, the decisions that have not yet been made and the assumptions that have not yet been tested.

If the questions are uncomfortable, that is the point. Comfort at this stage of a programme is the single most reliable indicator that something has been missed.

Theme 1 · Operational Involvement

Who is actually in the room when requirements are written?

Operational involvement is the foundation that every later decision rests on. A system specified without meaningful input from the people who will use it cannot be rescued by good training, good change management, or good vendor relationships. The gap gets papered over, not closed. This theme surfaces whether operational staff have real authority over the specification, or whether their involvement is ceremonial.

Question 1 · Who wrote the operational requirements, and what was their most recent day on position?

Why this matters

Requirements documents for ATM systems are routinely written by people whose operational currency is years old, or who never held a rating in the first place. This is not a criticism of those people — requirements work is a specialist skill, and the people who do it well are valuable. But when the writing is done without a currently rated controller at the table with equal authority, the specification drifts away from the operation in ways that are invisible until the system is installed. Features that controllers use on every shift get classified as nice-to-have. Workflows that depend on a specific interaction pattern get described in terms that technically survive translation into a specification but lose the thing that made them work. The gap does not appear on any document. It appears eighteen months later, in a training room, as hostility.

What a strong answer looks like

A named individual or small group, currently rated, operationally active within the last six months, with the authority to reject a specification line that does not reflect operational reality. Not a review role. Not a consultation role. Authority to reject.

What a weak answer reveals

"The project team drafted the requirements and operations reviewed them" is a weak answer, even when it is delivered with confidence. Review is not authorship. A reviewer can flag concerns; an author can refuse to sign. If the only people who could refuse to sign the requirements were programme managers and vendors, then the requirements reflect what the programme and

the vendor were willing to commit to — not what the operation needs. The distinction looks bureaucratic on paper. It is the difference between a system that reaches operational service and one that does not.

Question 2 · When operational staff raised concerns about the specification, what happened to those concerns?

Why this matters

Every ATM procurement I have seen involves at least one moment where a working controller raises a concern about the specification and is either overruled, deferred, or quietly routed around. The concern itself is less important than what happened next. Programmes that track, respond to, and visibly act on operational concerns build credibility that carries through installation and into training. Programmes that do not, accumulate a silent backlog of unresolved objections that resurface, all at once, the first time controllers are asked to sit in front of the system.

What a strong answer looks like

A documented log of concerns raised during the specification phase, each with a traceable disposition: accepted, rejected with a written justification, or deferred with a named decision point. The log is visible to the operational staff who raised the concerns. When a concern was rejected, the person who raised it was told why, by someone with the authority to make that call.

What a weak answer reveals

"We had regular consultation meetings" is not an answer to this question. Neither is "all concerns were considered." If there is no log, there is no record of what was raised, which means there is no way to distinguish between concerns that were addressed and concerns that were absorbed into the project's silence. The absence of a log is not a filing failure. It is evidence that the concerns were not taken seriously enough to track.

Question 3 · How many of the features controllers use on their current system are explicitly named in the new system's requirements?

Why this matters

This is the question that catches the most programmes out, because the answer requires work that was almost never done. The assumption in most

procurements is that the new system will do everything the old one did, plus more. The assumption is almost always wrong. Legacy systems accumulate workflows, shortcuts, and local adaptations over decades of operational use, many of which are not documented anywhere except in the muscle memory of the people who use them. A new system specified without an explicit feature-by-feature audit of the legacy environment will arrive missing things that nobody noticed were there, until they are not.

What a strong answer looks like

A current-state feature inventory, built by operational staff, compared line by line against the new system's requirements. Gaps identified. Decisions made — explicitly and in writing — about which gaps will be closed through system configuration, which through procedural change, and which will be accepted as losses. The operational staff who built the inventory were told which category each of their features fell into, and why.

What a weak answer reveals

"The vendor has assured us the new system is functionally equivalent" is the answer that precedes the worst transitions. Functional equivalence is a claim that cannot be verified without the audit. If the audit has not been done, the claim is not false — it is untested. Untested claims about functional equivalence are the single most common source of the training-room hostility that derails programmes in their second year.

Review is not authorship. A reviewer can flag concerns; an author can refuse to sign.

Theme 2 · Transition Ownership

Who owns the path from installation to operational service, and do they have the authority to deliver it?

There is a gap in almost every ATM modernisation programme between the moment the system is physically installed and the moment it carries live traffic. That gap is where most programmes stall. It is rarely anyone's explicit job to close it. The vendor's contractual obligations usually end at installation and acceptance testing. The project office's remit usually ends at delivery. The operations department usually assumes the project will hand them something ready to use. None of these assumptions survive contact with reality. This theme forces the reader to name the person who owns the gap, name their authority, and name what happens if that person is not there.

Question 4 · Who is accountable for the system reaching operational service, and what happens to them if it does not?

Why this matters

Accountability without consequence is not accountability. Most ATM modernisation programmes have a named programme director, a steering committee, and a governance structure that looks, on paper, like it assigns ownership of the outcome. In practice, when a programme stalls, the accountability diffuses. The vendor points to the specification. The project office points to the vendor. The operations department points to the project office. The steering committee receives a status update and asks for a revised timeline. Nobody's career, budget, or standing is materially affected by the delay, which means nobody is structurally motivated to prevent it. The question is not who is named on the org chart. The question is who has something to lose.

What a strong answer looks like

A single named individual, internal to the ANSP or CAA, whose performance assessment, continued tenure, or professional reputation is explicitly tied to the system reaching operational service on the agreed timeline. That person has the authority to make binding decisions about scope, resourcing, and sequencing without escalating every call to a committee. They are senior enough to be listened to and close enough to the operation to be credible.

What a weak answer reveals

"The programme director is accountable" is a weak answer if the programme director's tenure is shorter than the programme itself, which it frequently is. Programme directors rotate. Steering committees reshuffle. If the person accountable today will have moved on before the consequences of today's decisions materialise, the accountability is notional. The same applies when the named accountable party is a committee. Committees do not lose sleep. Individuals do. A programme whose only accountable entity is a committee has, in practice, no accountable entity at all.

Question 5 · Who is building the bridge between what the system can do and what operations actually need, and is that their full-time job?

Why this matters

The work of making an ATM system operational is not installation, and it is not training. It is the months of unglamorous, technically demanding work that sits between the two: learning the system from the inside, configuring it against current AIRAC and operational requirements, writing procedures that reflect what the system actually does rather than what the specification said it would do, feeding the safety case with accurate information, and translating between the vendor's technical view and the operation's procedural view. This work requires someone who understands the operation well enough to know what it needs, and who is willing to spend six to eighteen months learning a system in detail. It cannot be done in the margins of someone's existing job. It cannot be outsourced to the vendor, who does not know the operation, or to the operation, which does not yet know the system. If nobody has been assigned to this work full-time, it is not being done. It will appear to be done, because project plans will list the tasks and governance meetings will report progress against them. But the actual work — the sitting with the system, the breaking and fixing, the translating — will not be happening.

What a strong answer looks like

One or more named individuals, operationally credible, assigned full-time to the transition work, with a reporting line that gives them protection from being pulled back into operational coverage when the roster gets tight. They have been in the role long enough to have built genuine familiarity with the system, and they have the authority to convene the people they need — training, safety, regulatory, vendor — without booking the meeting through three layers of administration.

What a weak answer reveals

"Our senior operational staff are supporting the project alongside their normal duties" is the answer that guarantees the work is not being done. Senior operational staff, by definition, have operational duties that cannot be deferred. When the roster demands their presence on position, the transition work is the thing that gets paused. The pauses accumulate. The project plan continues to report green because the tasks are notionally assigned, and nobody is tracking the gap between assignment and execution until it is too late to close it. The same applies when the answer names the vendor as the bridge-builder. The vendor does not know the operation and has no contractual obligation to learn it. Whatever the vendor builds will be technically correct and operationally wrong.

Question 6 · If the person owning the transition left tomorrow, what would happen?

Why this matters

The single biggest risk to most ATM modernisation programmes I have seen is not technical, regulatory, or commercial. It is the concentration of programme-critical knowledge in the heads of one or two people who are not being backed up, not being documented, and not being succession-planned. These people are usually the ones who have taught themselves the system in detail and become the organisation's only real bridge between the vendor and the operation. They are also, by virtue of having made themselves indispensable, frequently burnt out and frequently undervalued. The question is not whether they are likely to leave. The question is what happens if they do.

What a strong answer looks like

At least two people with working knowledge of the system configuration and the transition decisions made to date. Documentation that captures not just what was decided but why, in enough detail that a new person could pick up where the previous one left off without a month of reverse-engineering. A handover plan that exists on paper, not in someone's intention to write one eventually.

What a weak answer reveals

Silence. Or, more often, a pause followed by "well, we'd have a problem." If the honest answer is that the programme would stall for months while a replacement was found and brought up to speed, the programme is one resignation away from the delay it is currently trying to prevent. This is not a hypothetical risk. The people most likely to leave an ATM transition project mid-flight are the ones who have been carrying it, because they are the ones who can see the gap between what is being reported and what is actually happening. When they leave, the gap

becomes visible to everyone else — but by then, the person who could have closed it is gone.

Committees do not lose sleep. Individuals do. A programme whose only accountable entity is a committee has, in practice, no accountable entity at all.

Theme 3 · Organisational Readiness

Is the organisation capable of absorbing this change, and how do you know?

Organisational readiness is the theme most programmes believe they have handled and most programmes have not. The word "readiness" is used loosely in steering committee reports to mean something between "we have a plan" and "people seem enthusiastic." Neither of those is readiness. Readiness is the organisation's actual capacity to absorb a change of this magnitude — its belief that the change is worth making, and its confidence that it can make it without breaking something that matters. Those two things are distinct, they are measurable, and they are almost never assessed with any rigour before a modernisation contract is signed. This theme surfaces whether readiness has been established or assumed.

Question 7 · How do you know the operational workforce believes this change is worth making, and what did you do with what you found?

Why this matters

Belief that a change is worth making is not the same as acceptance that it is happening. Acceptance is compliance; belief is commitment. A workforce that accepts a change will do the minimum required and no more. A workforce that believes in the change will absorb the friction, tolerate the disruption, and defend the programme in the corridor conversations that determine whether it succeeds. The difference between the two is invisible in project dashboards and catastrophic in operational reality. Most programmes assume belief because nobody has openly objected, or because a staff briefing was held and questions were invited and none were asked. Silence in a staff briefing is not belief. It is, most often, the absence of a forum in which disagreement feels safe.

What a strong answer looks like

A structured assessment — survey, focus groups, or both — conducted early enough that the results could still influence the programme, of what the operational workforce actually thinks about the modernisation. The assessment asked questions specific enough to produce usable answers, not generic engagement questions dressed up as change readiness. The results were reported honestly, including the uncomfortable parts, and the programme

adjusted in visible ways in response to what was found. The workforce knows this happened, because they were told what changed and why.

What a weak answer reveals

"Staff have been briefed and are broadly supportive" is a non-answer. It describes a process, not a finding. If the programme cannot tell you what percentage of the operational workforce believes the change is worth making, or what the main sources of reservation are, then the programme does not know. Not knowing is a defensible position at the start of a programme. Not knowing eighteen months in, with installation imminent, is evidence that the question has been avoided because the answer was feared. That fear is usually correct. The workforce has reservations, and those reservations are about to become visible in the form of passive resistance that the programme will call a training problem.

Question 8 · How do you know the organisation can execute this change, and what would you be willing to bet on it?

Why this matters

Belief is one half of readiness. Capability is the other. An organisation can believe deeply in a modernisation programme and still be structurally incapable of delivering it, and belief without capability produces a particular and predictable failure mode: enthusiasm early, exhaustion in the middle, and recrimination at the end. Capability is not a question of headcount or budget. It is a question of whether the organisation has the operational depth, the technical competence, the regulatory relationships, and the internal coordination to do what the programme requires, at the pace the programme requires, without breaking the day-to-day operation that has to continue alongside it. Most programmes assume capability because the organisation has delivered things in the past. Past delivery is not evidence of current capability. Organisations lose capability quietly — through attrition, through reorganisation, through the departure of the people who actually knew how to get things done — and they usually do not notice until they try to do something hard.

What a strong answer looks like

A specific, unflinching account of where the organisation's capability is strong, where it is weak, and what has been put in place to address the weaknesses. Named individuals with the skills the programme requires, not job titles that imply the skills exist somewhere in the structure. Honest acknowledgement of the capabilities that do not exist in-house and a concrete plan for where they will

come from. The plan does not rely on a single consultant, a single vendor resource, or a single internal hero.

What a weak answer reveals

Confidence. Specifically, confidence that is not supported by evidence the speaker can produce on request. "We have a strong team" is a weak answer. "We have delivered programmes like this before" is a weak answer if the people who delivered those programmes are no longer in the roles they were in at the time. The test is whether the person answering the question can name the capability gaps. An answer that contains no gaps is not an answer about capability. It is an answer about self-image.

Question 9 · What kind of leadership is this programme actually going to need, and is that the kind of leadership it has?

Why this matters

The leadership a programme needs is not always the leadership it has, and the mismatch is usually invisible until the programme is in trouble. Transformation programmes are frequently assigned to leaders selected for their visionary qualities — the ability to articulate a compelling future, energise a workforce, and carry a room. Those qualities matter at the start of a programme, when belief is being built. They matter less, and sometimes not at all, in the long middle period when the work is procedural, the problems are unglamorous, and the thing the programme needs from its leadership is reliability, follow-through, and the patience to hold people to commitments they made months earlier. Programmes that start with visionary leadership and never transition to operational leadership tend to stall in exactly this middle period, because the leadership that was right for the launch is wrong for the grind. The question is not which style is better. The question is whether the programme's leadership matches the phase it is actually in.

What a strong answer looks like

A clear-eyed view of where the programme is in its lifecycle and what kind of leadership that phase requires. Acknowledgement that the leadership needs of a programme change over time, and a willingness to adjust leadership arrangements as the work moves from vision-setting to execution to stabilisation. Leaders whose behaviour is characterised by procedural reliability — clarity of expectation, consistency of follow-through, visible accountability — alongside the relational qualities that build trust across the operational workforce. A recognition that charisma is useful but insufficient.

What a weak answer reveals

Reliance on a single leader whose primary asset is the ability to inspire. Inspiration is a currency that spends quickly in an environment where people are being asked to change the way they work. When the inspiration runs out, as it always does, what remains is whatever structural leadership the programme built underneath it. Programmes that built nothing underneath discover this at the worst possible moment. The symptom to look for is in the language of the programme's own reporting: updates to the steering committee that describe progress in aspirational terms rather than in terms of commitments made and met. Aspirational reporting is what leadership produces when it has nothing concrete to report and does not want to say so.

An answer that contains no gaps is not an answer about capability. It is an answer about self-image.

Theme 4 · Post-Installation Reality

What have you planned for the eighteen months after the box arrives?

The period between physical installation and operational service is the part of an ATM modernisation programme that is most consistently under-planned, under-resourced, and under-discussed at the point of contract signature. It is also the period in which most of the real work happens. Installation is a milestone that looks like a finish line and is actually a starting line. Everything that determines whether the system will reach operational service — shadowing, parallel running, procedural refinement, safety case completion, regulatory approval, controller confidence — happens in this window. A programme that has not planned this period in detail, with named people and realistic timelines, is a programme that has planned to stop at installation and hope the rest takes care of itself. This theme forces the reader to confront what happens after the vendor leaves.

Question 10 · How long is the shadowing and parallel running period, and who decided?

Why this matters

Shadowing and parallel running are the mechanisms by which trust in a new ATM system is built. There is no substitute for them, and there is no way to compress them below a certain floor without accepting risks that should not be accepted. The length of this period is not a scheduling question. It is a function of how different the new system is from the old one, how confident the operational workforce is, how many edge cases the operation encounters in a normal month, and how much margin the regulator requires before signing off. A programme that has set this period by working backwards from a political go-live date has set it wrong. A programme that has set it by consulting the people who will be running the parallel operation — and listening to what they said — has a chance of getting it right. The question is not how long the period is. The question is how the length was decided, and by whom.

What a strong answer looks like

A shadowing and parallel running plan built from an honest assessment of the operational environment, the workforce's familiarity with the new system, and the regulatory approval requirements. The plan was developed with direct input from operational supervisors and the people who will be on position during the transition. The length is defensible on technical and operational grounds, not

political ones. There is explicit provision for extending the period if the operation is not ready, and the decision to extend does not require escalation to a level where extension is politically unacceptable.

What a weak answer reveals

A fixed date that cannot be moved. "We're going live on the first of the month" is a weak answer if nobody can explain why that date and not another. Dates set by political or commercial pressure are the single most common cause of premature cutover, and premature cutover is the single most common cause of the post-transition incidents that derail programmes in their final phase. If the person answering this question cannot name the operational reasoning behind the date, the date was not set operationally. It was set by someone whose incentives do not include the consequences of getting it wrong.

Question 11 · What is the plan for the first post-cutover incident, and who has signed off on it?

Why this matters

There will be an incident. It may be minor, it may be major, but there will be one, and the programme's response to it will determine whether the new system retains the confidence of the operational workforce or loses it permanently. Incidents in the first weeks after cutover are not ordinary incidents. They are stress tests of every decision made in the previous two years. They expose the gaps between the specification and the operation, between the training and the reality, between the confidence of the programme office and the confidence of the controllers. The programmes that handle these incidents well have thought about them in advance — who will investigate, how quickly, with what authority, and with what transparency. The programmes that handle them badly treat them as ordinary operational incidents and discover too late that the workforce is watching the response more carefully than the incident itself.

What a strong answer looks like

A specific, documented plan for how post-cutover incidents will be handled in the first ninety days. Named investigators with the authority to halt operations if necessary. Transparent communication protocols that commit to telling the operational workforce what happened, what is being done about it, and what the implications are for continued operation. A pre-agreed threshold at which the programme is willing to revert to the legacy system, and a named individual with the authority to make that call without escalating to a committee. The plan has

been reviewed by the operational workforce and the regulator, and it is understood by everyone who will be affected by it.

What a weak answer reveals

"We have a standard incident response process" is a weak answer. Standard processes are designed for stable operations, not for the first weeks after a system transition. A programme that plans to rely on standard processes has not understood what it is about to do. The absence of a bespoke post-cutover incident plan is not a planning oversight. It is an assumption that nothing unusual will happen, which is the assumption that guarantees the response will be inadequate when it does.

Question 12 · When the programme is complete, who owns the system, and what does ownership mean?

Why this matters

An ATM modernisation programme does not end at operational cutover. The system that has been installed will need configuration updates, procedural refinement, integration with future changes, and the accumulated small adjustments that all operational systems require over their lifetimes. Someone has to own this work, and the ownership has to be established before the programme closes, not after. Programmes that do not establish post-programme ownership leave behind systems that drift — not because anything goes wrong, but because nobody is specifically responsible for making sure they continue to go right. The drift is slow and invisible and then, one day, operationally significant. By that point the programme team has disbanded, the vendor has moved on, and the people who understood the transition decisions have gone to other projects. The question is not who will maintain the hardware. The question is who will carry the institutional memory of why the system was configured the way it was, and who has the authority to change it when the operation changes.

What a strong answer looks like

A named department or team within the ANSP or CAA, resourced and empowered to own the system beyond cutover. The team includes people who were involved in the transition, so that the decisions made during the programme do not have to be reverse-engineered by their successors. There is a documented handover from the programme team to the ownership team, and the handover is treated as a formal gate rather than an administrative formality. The ownership team has the authority to make binding decisions about system

configuration without routing every change through a committee that no longer exists.

What a weak answer reveals

Vagueness. "The operations department will take it on" is a weak answer if nobody in the operations department has been consulted about what taking it on involves. "The vendor will provide ongoing support" is a weak answer if the support contract does not include the institutional knowledge of why the system was configured the way it was, which vendor support contracts never do. The weakest answer of all is the one that implies the question is premature — that post-programme ownership is something to be worked out closer to the time. It is not. By the time it is close to the time, the people who should have been involved in the decision are no longer available, and the ownership defaults to whoever is left in the room. That is not ownership. That is abandonment.

Installation is a milestone that looks like a finish line and is actually a starting line.

What to do with this

If you have read this document from start to finish, one of three things is true.

The first possibility is that your programme has answered all twelve questions well, with named people, documented decisions, and evidence you could produce on request. If that is the case, this document has served no purpose for you beyond confirming what you already knew. That is a rare position to be in, and it is worth noting that most programme directors who believe they are in it are not.

The second possibility is that the earlier questions surfaced uncomfortable answers and the later ones did not. This is the most dangerous position of the three, because it suggests the programme feels as though it is on track — the post-installation planning is in place, the leadership is visible, the transition team is named — but the foundation beneath it is compromised. Programmes in this position typically discover the problem at training, diagnose it as a training issue, and spend the next eighteen months treating symptoms while the underlying cause continues to generate new ones. If this is your position, the work that needs doing is upstream of where the discomfort is currently being felt.

The third possibility is that the later questions surfaced uncomfortable answers regardless of how the earlier ones landed. This is the more common position, and it is also the more recoverable one. Late-stage gaps in transition planning, post-cutover incident response, and long-term system ownership can be closed if they are identified before the gaps start producing consequences. The window for closing them narrows as installation approaches, but it does not close entirely until cutover itself.

This document is not a scorecard and it does not produce a result. What it produces is a list of questions you can take into your next programme review and ask out loud. The value of the exercise is in the answers you get when you ask them, and in the silences you get when you ask them of people who have not been thinking about these things.

If the questions have surfaced things worth discussing, they are worth discussing. That is the only recommendation this document makes.

About the author

Daryl Rowe spent twenty years inside air traffic management operations before moving into advisory work. He trained and validated as an area controller at EUROCONTROL's Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre, then spent nearly a decade at Air Traffic and Navigation Services in Johannesburg in a combined training and standards role, running the simulator programme and examination system for the Area Control pool. In 2015 he joined Serco Middle East in Baghdad, where he led the operational transition from the legacy Autotrack II system to Thales TopSky across the Baghdad FIR — an eighteen-month programme covering approximately four hundred operational and technical staff, conducted in a post-conflict environment with the institutional and political constraints that implies. He remained in Baghdad for a further five years in progressively senior roles, ending as Operations and Airspace Manager with responsibility for operations, training, and the academy.

He holds an MBA from Plymouth Marjon University, with a dissertation on strategic leadership and organisational readiness for advanced air mobility across Gulf Cooperation Council air navigation service providers. He is Lean Six Sigma Black Belt certified.

Aspect Digital is his advisory practice. It works with air navigation service providers and civil aviation authorities on the operational and human side of ATM modernisation — the part of the programme that determines whether an installed system reaches operational service, and the part most programmes discover they have underinvested in only after the consequences are already in motion.

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